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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 1, 1863, Abraham Lincoln declared all slaves
in the Confederate States to be free through his Emancipation
Proclamation. It was a significant step toward the national
abolition of slavery—it was neither the first nor the last step. It
also violated the Fifth Amendment’s just compensation
requirement. Following the Civil War, the Supreme Court
attempted to rectify this constitutional crisis by ruling that the
Constitution did not apply to the states in rebellion during the
war.1 Following the War, the Thirteenth Amendment formally
made slavery unconstitutional throughout the United States.
Had the Emancipation Proclamation applied to the northern
states, it would have constituted a Fifth Amendment taking.
However, it was not a taking because it only applied to the
southern states which did not receive Constitutional protection,
according to the Court in Texas v. White.2
Section II will show the Constitutional basis for a
governmental taking; Section III will examine the value that
slavery represented to the Confederacy and the South’s
economic motivation for perpetuating slavery. Section IV will
analyze the Supreme Court’s removal of Constitutional
1
2

Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 703 (1868).
Id.
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protections for the Confederacy in its Texas v. White decision.
Section V will reconcile the Emancipation Proclamation, the
White decision, and the Thirteenth Amendment in this context.

II. A TAKING IN 1863
A. FEDERAL AUTHORITY FOR TAKING
Eminent domain is the power of the government to take
private property for public use.3 The Framers recognized the
potential for the public good to outweigh the need to preserve
private property rights. The Fifth Amendment in the Bill of
Rights addressed this circumstance, stating: “No person shall .
. . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.” 4 This provision is important
because it guarantees that the federal government cannot take
an individual’s property without compensating him, nor could
it deny him due process regarding the taking.
For most of the nineteenth century, the federal
government did not have the power to exercise eminent
domain over real property; that was exclusively a state power.5
In 1860, while debating federal legislation regarding
condemnation of land in California, then-Senator Jefferson
Davis said:
The men who framed this Government looked
with great jealousy to the encroach of the Federal
power on the domain of the States. Hence the
expressions of the Constitution are very
guarded; and I cannot believe that the character
of property which it was in consideration that
the Government might take for public uses, by
making just compensation therefore, was the
real estate or land lying within the limits of a
State. I rather suppose it was that character of
property which might be needed for immediate
use—horses, corn, and other things which may
U.S. CONST. AMEND . V.
Id.
5 Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 369 (1875).
3
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be necessary for the Government to use
immediately, such as a transport ship; but real
estate within the limits of a State I think the
Government should only acquire, first by
consent of the people, and then under the
operations of laws enacted by the State.6
In 1875, the Supreme Court held in Kohl v. United States that an
act of Congress which appropriated funds “to obtain by
purchase, or to obtain by condemnation in the courts” real
estate to construct post offices in Boston and Cincinnati
indicated that Congress anticipated the need to take the real
estate against the will of the owner.7 Through this holding, the
Court extended the federal government’s eminent domain
power to include real property.8
While the Fifth Amendment required just compensation
for a federal government taking, that protection did not apply
to the states. In Barron v. Baltimore, the Supreme Court held that
the Constitution applied exclusively to the federal government.
The Court’s justification was that the states were free to impose
limitations on themselves through their own constitutions. The
Court said:
The powers they conferred on this government
were to be exercised by itself; and the limitations
on power, if expressed in general terms, are
naturally, and, we think, necessarily, applicable
to the government created by the instrument.
They are limitations of power granted in the
instrument itself; not of distinct governments,
framed by different persons and for different
purposes.9
There, to improve city infrastructure and improve drainage, the
city of Baltimore created several new roads and diverted
several streams from draining into the Chesapeake Bay. 10
Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1790 (1860).
Kohl, 91 U.S. 367 at 369.
8 William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122
YALE L.J. 1738, 1777 (2013).
9 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247 (1833).
10 Id. at 244.
6
7
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Barron owned a wharf on that bay. Following these
infrastructure improvements, the water level in the area of the
wharf was significantly lower. The new level prevented larger
ships from docking at the wharf, causing Barron to lose dock
fees from these ships.11 Barron sued Baltimore, alleging the city
violated his Fifth Amendment right to just compensation.12 The
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the city, holding that the city
could not violate Barron’s right to just compensation because
the Fifth Amendment only applied to the federal government.
The Fifth Amendment’s eminent domain power and
just compensation requirement was substantially narrower in
1863 than the modern version. Specifically, that power only
applied to personal property and only required just
compensation only when the federal government did the
taking.13

B. SLAVES AS PROPERTY
The Constitution recognized slaves as property from its
inception. For example, Article IV, section two, clause three:
No person held to service or labour in one state,
under the laws thereof, escaping into another,
shall, in consequence of any law or regulation
therein, be discharged from such service or
labour, but shall be delivered up on claim of the
party to whom such service or labour may be
due.14 (emphasis added)
In 1859, the Circuit Court for the District of Virginia held in U.S.
v. Amy that the government owed no compensation to a slave
owner when the slave committed a crime that required the slave
to be jailed. No compensation was warranted because jailing
the slave only incidentally burdened the property rights of the
owner.15 The court further examined slaves as property:

Id.
Id. at 245.
13 See Kohl, 91 U.S. at 367, 369; Barron, 32 U.S. at 243, 247.
14 The Thirteenth Amendment repealed this clause.
15 U.S. v. Amy, 24 F.Cas. 792, 810 (C.C.D. Va. 1859).
11
12
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In expounding this law, we must not lose sight
of the twofold character which belongs to the
slave. He is a person, and also property. As
property, the rights of the owner are entitled to
the protection of the law. As a person, he is
bound to obey the law, and may, like any other
person, be punished if he offends against it; and
he may be embraced in the provisions of the law,
either by the description of property or as a
person, according to the subject-matter upon
which congress or a state is legislating.
(emphasis added)
In contrast, Congress exercised its direct control of Washington,
D.C. when it passed the Compensated Emancipation Act in
1862, a law freeing all slaves in the District of Columbia.16 This
law compensated all slaveholders three hundred dollars per
slave. Both the law and Amy recognized that slaves were
people; both recognized that slaves were also property. The
circuit court did so explicitly, while the Congress did so
implicitly by complying with the Fifth Amendment.
By June of 1862, attitudes toward compensation for
emancipation had changed. Congress acted consistently with
Amy by freeing all slaves in the territories without
compensation. 17 This likely violated the Fifth Amendment,
according to Barron v. Baltimore, because the territories derived
their power from the federal Constitution, not a state
constitution.18 Both Amy and Dred Scott v. Sandford,19 one of the
most famous Supreme Court cases in American history,
recognize slaves were property. Congress also endorsed this
idea by compensating slave owners in the District of Columbia
for emancipation. By the standards of the time, the Fifth
Amendment required just compensation for emancipating the
territories, yet none was given.
In 1862, Congress again recognized that emancipation
required compensation when it passed a resolution stating that
Northern states could voluntarily emancipate in exchange for
12 Stat. 376, 377 (1862).
12 Stat. 432 (1862).
18 Baude, supra note 8, at 1792-93.
19 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
16
17
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compensation. 20 President Lincoln famously wrote to the
Philadelphia Inquirer newspaper encouraging the states to
accept the proposal.21 The states did not accept the proposal,
but it demonstrated Congress’s recognition of the Fifth
Amendment requirement of compensation for emancipation.
Congress passed two statutes that permitted Northern
slave owners whose slaves fought for the Union Army to file a
claim with the federal government for the loss of that slave’s
services.22 The only requirements to file a claim were proof of
ownership of the slave and proof of the slave’s military
service. 23 A successful claim earned the slave-owner three
hundred dollars and the slave his freedom.24 Of note, section
twenty-four of the act says “award to each loyal person to
whom a colored volunteer may owe service a just
compensation.”25 (emphasis added)
Article IV, section 2 of the Constitution is evidence that
the Framers viewed slaves as property that warranted
protection from the federal government. Compensation claims
based on voluntary military service show a contemporaneous
acceptance of the Framer’s notion during the Civil War period.
The notion that slaves were the type of property the Fifth
Amendment was designed to protect is further shown by the
term “just compensation” in the military service compensation
act—the exact language used in the Fifth Amendment.
On this basis, Congress regarded slaves as property like
any other, making just compensation due for their
emancipation. This attitude was likely derived from slavery’s
significant economic value and reinforced by the Court’s
decision in Dred Scott.

H.R.J. Res. No. 26, 37th Cong. (1862).
Abraham Lincoln, Message From the President, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER (Mar. 7, 1862), available at
https://www.sethkaller.com/item/1346-30001.28-Lincoln’sCompensated-Emancipation-Proposal.
22 ST. LOUIS COUNTY LIBRARY, SLAVE COMPENSATION CLAIMS , U.S.
COLORED TROOPS (2018), available at
https://www.slcl.org/content/slave-compensation-claims-uscolored-troops-index-last-name-soldier.
23 13 Stat. 11 (1864).
24 Id.
25 Id.
20
21
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III. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF A SLAVE
A. DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD EXPLICITLY CALLS SLAVES
PROPERTY

Dred Scott was a slave purchased by John Emerson in
1832. Emerson took Scott with him when he moved around
the country; first from Virginia to Missouri, then throughout the
Northwest Territory, and finally to Wisconsin. While they were
in Wisconsin, Congress passed the Missouri Compromise,
which outlawed slavery north of Missouri, including in
Wisconsin.27 Emerson left Scott in Wisconsin, with Scott’s wife
and children, when Emerson moved to Louisiana. 28 In 1843,
Emerson died in Missouri, leaving his estate to his wife, Irene
Sanford, including Scott and his family.29 Scott sued Sanford for
his and his family’s freedom in Missouri. The Supreme Court of
Missouri ruled for Sanford because Missouri was a slave state.
Scott sued in federal court, eventually appealing to the United
States Supreme Court.30
The Supreme Court held that Scott had no standing to
sue because he was not a United States citizen by sole virtue of
his race.31 In its holding, the Court continued: “[t]he only two
clauses in the Constitution which point to this race, treat them
as persons whom it was morally lawful to deal in as articles of
property and to hold as slaves.” 32 (emphasis added) The Court
expanded Scott’s lack of citizenship to all people of African
descent.33
The Court’s rationale was that its job was to interpret the
Constitution as written, not influence public policy. Chief
26

Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 397 (1857).
Specifically, the Missouri Compromise outlawed slavery north of
36°30’, permitted Missouri to enter the Union as a slave state, Maine
to enter as a free state, and required new states to enter the Union is
pairs: one free, one slave. Roberta Alexander, Dred Scott: The Decision
That Sparked a Civil War, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 643, 644 (2007).
28 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 397-98.
29 Due to a clerical error, Sanford’s name was spelled “Sandford” in
the case name. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 393, 397.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 394.
32 Id. at 393.
33 Id.
26
27
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Justice John Marshall famously said: “[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is.” 34 By “saying what the law is” the Dred Scott majority
stripped the citizenship of millions of people and explicitly
endorsed the notion that African-descended slaves were
property with “no rights which the white man was bound to
respect.” 35

B. SLAVERY HAD IMMENSE ECONOMIC VALUE.
Racial superiority was not the sole motivation for
perpetuating slavery. By 1860, slavery was the single most
valuable asset in the South; more valuable than land, the
railroads, and the banks. The total value of Southern
agricultural land in 1860 was 2.3 billion dollars; slaves were
valued at 3.1 billion dollars. 36 Emancipation would eliminate
the value of slavery completely; that aspect of the economy
would no longer exist. The complete elimination of the
institution was a rational fear of the slave owners based on this
immense value. To put this value in perspective, in 1860 the
total valuation of all real property, personal property, and
machinery, in the United States, was 16.1 billion dollars.37 That
value was not distributed evenly—the industrial North was
worth 9.7 billion dollars while the agrarian South was worth 6.3
billion dollars.38 In the North, where many states had abolished
slavery, the value of slavery was virtually nothing. However, in
the South, slaves represented 3.1 of that 6.3 billion dollar whole.
Slavery represented approximately 49% of the entire value of all
property—real estate, personal property, and machinery—in
the South.
Based on these relative values, the Emancipation
Proclamation had an immense effect on the Southern economy
and little effect on the North. While the Emancipation
Proclamation did not apply to the Northern states, the value of
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407.
36 GAVIN WRIGHT , SLAVERY AND AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
59-60 (2013) (citing U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 460-462); figures are in 1860 dollars.
37 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED
STATES A 3-41, Table 2.
38 WRIGHT , supra note 36, at 60.
34
35
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slavery to the North was essentially zero, so its effect was
minimal. However, the instantaneous elimination of 49% of the
property value in the South would affect every individual
Southerner, slaver owner and non-slave owner alike.
Abolition would have been a devastating economic
blow to the South. While racial superiority is indisputably a
significant motivating factor for the perpetuation of slavery, the
economic factor likewise cannot be denied. Absent the racial
factors, it is possible that the South would have just as
aggressively pursued the war effort because abolition
disproportionately affected the South to such a degree. Simply
put, it was easy to be a Northern abolitionist because their
livelihood did not depend on slavery. It was much harder to be
a Southern abolitionist when the entire economy was
structured around the institution.

C. THE ARMY BECOMES THE TOOL OF EMANCIPATION
Lincoln was conflicted by the Dred Scott decision.39 He
valued and respected the law greatly but disagreed with the
decision; he said: “[the Republican Party] think[s] the Dred Scott
decision is erroneous . . . we shall do what we have to over-rule
this.” 40 In early 1861, General John C. Frémont, commander of
the Union army in the West, escalated his approach to the
prosecution of the war. He declared martial law in Missouri,
proclaiming that any person caught bearing arms against the
Union would be tried in a military court and executed if
convicted. 41 Furthermore, any person caught aiding the rebels
would have their slaves seized and emancipated.42 Lincoln did
not agree with Frémont’s heavy-handed tactics and privately
ordered him to cease.43 Lincoln needed the support of the proUnion slave states of Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, and
Delaware and did not want to risk turning them Confederate.
When Frémont would not relent, Lincoln publicly reprimanded

DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 201 (1995).
Id.
41 Id. at 314.
42 Id.
43 Id.
39
40
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him, revoked his order, and removed Frémont from
command.44
In May 1861, Confederate General John Cary entered
Union Fort Monroe, in Virginia, under a flag of truce seeking
the return of two escaped slaves. 45 He invoked the Fugitive
Slave Clause of the Constitution as justification for their
return. 46 General Benjamin Butler, commander of the fort,
declared the slaves were “contrabands of war,” and were the
equivalent of military property which could not be returned
because they were directly furthering the war effort. 47 Butler
further considered the Confederacy to be a foreign country, in
which the Fugitive Slave Clause did not apply. 48
By August, the Secretary of War issued guidance that all
military commander should follow Butler’s precedent and to
deny Confederates the return of their slaves.49 After the war, the
Supreme Court of Texas derided this action as unconstitutional,
stating in Hall v. Keese:
Because the Constitution gives Congress the
power to declare and fund war, any
“contrabands of war” go to the Congress. The
President merely prosecutes the war on behalf of
Congress, so his orders to capture and free slaves
was unconstitutional. lf the people of Texas were
citizens of the United States during the rebellion
they could not be deprived of their property
without due process of law. If they were a part
of another state or a de facto government, and
they and their property were captured by the
forces of the United States, it belonged to

Id. at 315.
Robert Fabrikant, Lincoln, A Reluctant, But Still Great Emancipator:
A Review of James Oakes, Freedom National: The Destruction Of Slavery
In The United States, 1861-1865, 57 HOW. L. J. 93, 98 (2013).
46 Id.
47 UNITED STATES NATIONAL PARK SERVICE , FORT MONROE AND THE
"CONTRABANDS OF WAR" (2018), available at
https://www.nps.gov/articles/fort-monroe-and-the-contrabandsof-war.htm.
48 Id.
49 Id.
44
45
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congress and not the commander-in-chief of the
army to make rules concerning those captures.50
President Lincoln later relied on this authority as Commander
and Chief of the Army and Navy in the Emancipation
Proclamation, which is based on the contraband of war theory
first adopted by General Butler in 1861.51
Congress codified Butler’s “contrabands of war” theory
in the Confiscation Act of 1861.52 The Act statutorily authorized
Union troops to seize rebel property used to further the
rebellion.53 It explicitly included slaves, lumping them in with
other property like horses, food, and weapons. 54 This Act
codified the military order, which itself was based on the
popular notion that slaves were property. That notion was
reinforced by Dredd Scott. Each action—Dredd Scott, the
Confiscation Act of 1861, and Butler’s proclamation—are an
endorsement by the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial
branches that the federal government regarded slaves as
property; taking property required just compensation.

IV. IN LIGHT OF TEXAS V. WHITE, DID THE CONFEDERATE
STATES WARRANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION?
A. THE CONFEDERATE STATES NEVER LEFT THE UNION.
In 1851, the United States government issued $5,000,000
in bonds to the state of Texas.55 The terms of the bond stated
they were payable to the state of Texas or the bearer of bonds.56
Each bond contained a statement that the debt was authorized
by an act of Congress and was “transferable on delivery.” 57 In
1861, Texas still held the majority of the bonds.58 Later that year,

Hall v. Keese, 31 Tex. 504 (Tex. 1868) (emphasis added); this
decision was published two months before Texas v. White.
51 Emancipation Proclamation, infra note 74.
52 Confiscation Act of 1861, 12 Stat. 319.
53 DONALD , supra note 39, at 149.
54 Id.; Confiscation Act, supra note 52.
55 Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 703 (1869).
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
50
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Texas joined the Confederacy in rebellion against the United
States.
By 1862, Texas needed funds to prosecute the war.
January 11, 1862 the Texas legislature passed an act “to dispose
of any bonds and coupons which may be in the treasury on any
account, and use such funds or their proceeds for the defence of
the State” 59 The United States bonds were sold for medicine and
other supplies to support Texan and Confederate soldiers.60
Following the Confederate defeat, Texas was
readmitted into the United States as part of the broader
reconstruction plan. In 1866, a state convention passed an
ordinance seeking recovery of the bonds.61 It declared the sale
was invalid because the rebel government was not authorized
to sell or redeem the bonds, and the proceeds were used to take
up arms against the United States.62 The Supreme Court ruled
that Texas never left the Union:
When Texas became one of the United States, she
entered into an indissoluble relation. The union
between Texas and the other States was as
complete, as perpetual, and as indissoluble as
the union between the original States. There was
no place for reconsideration or revocation,
except through revolution or through consent of
the States.
Considered as transactions under the
Constitution, the ordinance of secession,
adopted by the convention, and ratified by a
majority of the citizens of Texas, and all the acts
of her legislature intended to give effect to that
ordinance, were absolutely null. They were
utterly without operation in law. The State did
not cease to be a State, nor her citizens to be
citizens of the Union.63

Id. at 705.
Id.
61 Id. at 708.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 700-01.
59
60
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The Court explained its holding by saying: “for States, like
individuals, retain their identity, though changed, to some
extent, in their constituent elements. And it was the State, thus
constituted, which was now entitled to the benefit of the
Constitutional guaranty.” 64
Based on White, it is for Congress to decide what
government is the established government in a state. During the
Civil War, the rights of Texas as a member of the Union, and the
people of Texas as citizens of the Union were suspended. The
state of Texas continued to be one of the United States,
notwithstanding the ordinance of secession.65
The holding in White contradicts the Constitution. For
example: article IV, section two, clause one: “[t]he Citizens of
each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens in the several States.” 66 White created a different set of
rules for individuals depending on what state those individuals
were in. According to White, the Constitution did not protect a
citizen of Tennessee, being from a state in rebellion. However,
a citizen of Kentucky, being just across the border, would have
merited Constitutional protections based on that state’s status
as a loyal member of the Union. On its face, this situation is
adverse to article IV, section 2 because it creates different
privileges and immunities depending on the individual’s
citizenship. Additionally, White is agnostic to the individual’s
loyalties. White justifies this position by stating that individuals
in rebellion gave up their Constitutional protections by taking
arms against the Union. 67 Almost certainly there were proConfederacy Kentuckians and Tennesseans loyal to the Union.
White does not make individual loyalty to the Union a necessary
condition, only state citizenship.
Furthermore, article VI, clause 2, the Supremacy Clause,
declares “[t]his Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding.” 68 This means that the
Constitution trumps any other federal and state law. The
Supremacy Clause establishes a base line that every law must
Id.
Id. at 708.
66 U.S. CONST . art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
67 White, 74 U.S. at 733-34.
68 U.S. CONST . art VI, cl. 2.
64
65
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conform to the provisions of the Constitution; therefore, the
Constitution always applies. According to the Supremacy
Clause, in a conflict between the Fifth Amendment and the
Emancipation Proclamation, which is an executive order, the
Fifth Amendment is controlling because it is a part of the
Constitution. If the Fifth Amendment governs the action, then
just compensation is required for a taking. Whether intentional
or not, the White holding ran counter to the Supremacy Clause
by favoring the Emancipation Proclamation over the Fifth
Amendment. While freeing the slaves was undoubtedly the
right moral action to take, the Supreme Court attempted to
shoe-horn right moral action with the law with its Texas v. White
decision. Rather than consistently apply the Constitution, the
Court chose to do the morally right thing, and created law to do
it.

B. WHITE AS APPLIED BY A LOWER COURT.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee applied White in State
v. President of Bank of Tennessee:69
Tennessee existed as one of the States of the
Union before the rebellion; it continued so
during the rebellion. In the language of Chief
Justice Chase, in Texas v. White, ‘the obligation of
the State as a member of the Union, and of every
citizen of the State as a citizen of the United
States, remained perfect and unimpaired. It
certainly follows that the State did not cease to
be a State, nor her citizens to be citizens of the
Union.’ The corresponding right of the citizens
of the State to the protection of the laws of the
United States was, for the time of the rebellion,
suspended.
Like Texas, Tennessee remained part of the United States, but
the Constitution did not apply. There, the Bank of Tennessee
was ordered to pay back debts outstanding prior to 1861.
Priority was given first to the state, then to debts owed prior to

69

State v. President of Bank of Tenn., 64 Tenn. 1, 73 (Tenn. 1875).
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May 6, 1861.70 All claims after May 6, 1861, while the state was
in rebellion, were “absolutely null and void” because the funds
had been raised to further the war effort. 71 Creditors whose
claims were based on loans made after May 6 argued that the
Constitution prohibited the nullification of a private contract.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee applied White when it held
that Constitutional protections did not apply during the Civil
War, therefore the General Assembly was justified in barring
those debts.72
This case is instructive as an example of the application
of Texas v. White because it shows how a court was likely to rule
in a case for emancipation-based compensation. A claim for just
compensation based on emancipation would essentially claim
that the government owed a debt to an individual slave owner.
Like the creditors in Bank of Tennessee, the debt would arise out
of the events of the Civil War. Applying White like the Supreme
Court of Tennessee did, a court would likely hold that the Fifth
Amendment did not protect the slave owner and no debt was
owed. While that seems like the type of tyranny the Framers
intended the Fifth Amendment to guard against, that is the
logical conclusion to which the White decision leads.
The White decision was a retroactive justification for
right moral action. These cases are attempts to reconcile
emancipation with practicality and the law. While
emancipation was the right thing to do morally, the notion that
the states never left the Union implies that the Constitution
continued to apply to them. While paying just compensation for
every slave in the South was an impractically large sum, that is
what the Constitution required. However, emancipation was
the right moral action and the courts constructed a justification
for it.
On May 6, 1861 a referendum was held for the question of
secession; it passed overwhelmingly. Tennessee officially became
part of the Confederacy June 8, 1861. JAMES WALTER FERTIG, THE
SECESSION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF TENNESSEE 24-26 (1898).
71 Bank of Tenn., 64 Tenn. at 101.
72 Id. at 165-66.; But see 12 Op. Att’y. Gen. 19 (1866) (stating “private
debts are not annulled by war,” and further recommending that the
government make restitution to a loyalist living in Virginia whose
property was taken pursuant the Confiscation Act of 1861 but did
not use that property to further the Confederate war effort.).
70
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V. RECONCILING THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION WITH
WHITE—THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT.
A. THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION
Lincoln issued the “Preliminary Emancipation
Proclamation” on September 22, 1862.73 This preliminary order
declared that on January 1, 1863 all slaves held in the
Confederate States would be free; those states had one hundred
days to reconcile and accept a gradual emancipation or that
“the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and
maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts
to repress such persons.” 74 Lincoln was aware of the legal
implications of freeing slaves without compensation.
Paragraph thirteen of the Preliminary Proclamation:
And the executive will in due time recommend
that all citizens of the United States who shall
have remained loyal thereto throughout the
rebellion, shall (upon the restoration of the
Constitutional relation between the United
States, and their respective States, and people, if
that relation shall have been suspended or
disturbed) be compensated for all losses by acts
of the United States, including the loss of slaves.
This means Lincoln, as the executive, would recommend that
loyal slaveholders in the North be justly compensated for
taking their slaves, pursuant to the Fifth Amendment.
Lincoln was careful to invoke his powers as
Commander and Chief, enforcing the Proclamation through
military force and limiting the scope to only states-in-rebellion.
This may indicate he may have been unsure if the Constitution
applied to the Confederacy or not; he distinguishes the point by
saying: “if that relation has been suspended or disturbed,” not
simply “that relation has been suspended.” 75 (emphasis added)

DONALD , supra note 39, at 374.
Proclamation No. 16 (Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation), 12
Stat. 1267, para. 3 (Sept. 22, 1862).
75 Id.
73
74
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It seems Lincoln recognized that a conflict existed: the
morally right action was freeing the slaves, but the law
regarded these individuals as property that required
compensation. The constitutionality of the Emancipation
Proclamation was never tested because of the Thirteenth
Amendment.76

B. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or
any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce
this article by appropriate legislation.77
The Thirteenth Amendment constitutionalized the
Emancipation Proclamation.78 The concise, clear meaning of
the Thirteenth Amendment solves the Constitutional problem
with emancipation: namely, the Fifth Amendment requirement
of just compensation was no longer applicable and military
force was not required for enforcement. The Thirteenth
Amendment and Texas v. White attempted to legitimize the
right moral action of emancipation with the law. Freeing the
slaves was undoubtedly the right moral thing to do; in 1863 it
was not yet the legal thing to do.
When the states ratified the Thirteenth Amendment the
abolition of slavery became Constitutional. With the White
decision, the Emancipation Proclamation became retroactively
legal. These acts attempted to reconcile the right moral action
with the law. The Justices and Congressmen recognized the
enormous economic impact of slavery’s abolition, and the Civil
War in general, that would motivate compensation claims.
Their only option was to fundamentally change the law. These
Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Lincoln, The Emancipation Proclamation, And
Executive Power, 73 MD . L. REV. 100 (2013).
77 U.S. Const. amend. XIII.
78 Lauren Kares, The Unlucky Thirteenth: A Constitutional Amendment
in Search of A Doctrine, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 372, 373 (1995).
76
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laws were part of the broader reconstruction context which
sought to rebuild, reconcile, and move on from the war. The
most effective way to do that was to ratify a broad change to the
Constitution and reinterpret the law in such a way as to
retroactively legitimize it.
The Thirteenth Amendment is the answer to the
inconsistency between the Fifth Amendment and the
Emancipation Proclamation. It prevented the condition of
slavery which lead to the taking by the Emancipation
Proclamation. The Thirteenth Amendment effectively
prevented any future litigation from arising because it made
slavery explicitly, and indisputably, unconstitutional. The
Texas v. White decision effectively cut off any potential takings
litigation that might arise out of the Emancipation
Proclamation.

